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530 MILLER v; DYER [20 C. (2d) 
Oaldwell, 41 Cal. '611. See, also, Pomeroy, Specific Perform-
ance of Contracts, 3d ed., p. 900). In Linehan v. Devincense, 
170 Cal. 307 [149 Pac. 584], the vendee failed to show an 
existing contract and his unexplained laches precluded any 
right to specific performance. The statement in the opinion 
that "as she [the vendor] could not have compelled specific 
performance of the eontract, so specific performance may 
not be enforced against her ... [citing Civ. Code § 3386] " 
was not necessary to the decision of the case, and is without 
support in the authoritieS. It is therefore disapproved by our 
decision herein. [3] Section 3386 of the Civil Code, which states 
that "Neither party to an obligation can be compelled spe-
cifically to perform it, unless the other party thereto has per-
formed, or is compellable specifically to perform, everything 
to which the former is entitled under the same obliga-
tion ... " codifies the rule of mutuality of remedy that was 
well established in' equity jurisprudence at the time of the 
adoption of the code. (See, 23 Cal. Jur. 448.) That rule was 
never considered applicable where the unavailability of the 
remedy to the party against whom relief was sought resulted 
from his own default. (Smiddy v.Grafton, supra; Farnum 
v. Olarke, supra,' McOowen v. Pew, Supra; Easton v. Mont-
gomery, supra; Swain v. Burnette, supra; Marshall v. Oald-
well, supra; Armstrong v. Sacramento V. R. 00., 52 Cal. App. 
110 [198 Pac. 217]. See, also, 28 Cal. L. Rev. 503; 16 CaL 
L. Rev. 541; Pomeroy, Specific Performance, 3d ed., p. 903 
(1926); 2 Story,' Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., p. 457 (1918». 
[4] It is contended that the complaint fails to state a cause 
of action against Hector and Elizabeth Dyer since they were 
not parties to the contract that plaintiffs seek specifically to 
enforce. They hold the legal title to the land sought to be 
conveyed, however, as trustees for Mabelle Dyer. Since the 
latter may be compelled to convey her equitable interest in 
the land to plaintiffs and since equity avoids circuity of 
action, Hector and Elizabeth Dyer may be compelled to con-
vey the legal title to them. (M'Donald v. Yungbluth, supra; 
Miedema v. Wormhoudt, supra; see 33 Harv. L. Rev. 822.) 
[5] It is also contended that the complaint fails, to, state a 
cause of action against the, title company and the loan asso-
ciation. The title company holds the proceeds of the loan for 
the benefit of the party entitled thereto upon the completion 
of the transaction. The loan association made the loan, trans-
';' 
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mitted the proceeds to the title company,' and received a trust 
deed on the land involved. The asserted adverse interests of 
both defendants in the property arose out of transactions 
with the principal defendant, Mabelle Dyer, concerning her 
contract with the plaintiffs. Those interests must, be .deter-
mined to give plaintiffs proper relief and to avoid CIrcuity 
of action. . ' , . ; 
[6] The special demurrer of defendants title company; and 
loan association on the grounds of misjoinder of parties de-
fendant and of improper uniting of several causes of action 
fails to specify wherein the alleged misjoinder exists. (Healy 
v. Visalia db T. R. 00., 101 'Cal. 585 [36 Pac; 125].) [71The'spe-
cial demurrer of defendants Dyer on the ground that cal1ses 
of action for specific performance and for breach ofanagr~~~ 
mentto convey real property have beeu united improperly 
fails to . take into account that the repudiatlonof the contract 
gav~rise to a single cause of action regltrdless of the re;m:e~ 
dies available to plaintiffs .. (Abbott v. 76.Land db Water Qo" 
161qal. 42 [118 Pac. 425] ; San Diego Wa~er 00. v .. San Diego 
Flume 00., 108 Cal. 54;9 [41 ?ac. 495, 29L. RoA .. 839].) 
[8] The contention that the alleged cause of action is barred 
by the provisions of subdivision 40£ section 1624 of the Civil 
Code b~cause a part of the alleged agr~e:ment for the exchange 
of, real property was not in writing i~ .' untenable: The . fact 
that Mabelle Dyer's supplementary oral agreement to make 
up in cash the amount of the loan deducted by the 'lender 
may be unenforceable .loes not prevent, enforcement of the 
written contract~ (See cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 925.) 
The judgments are reversed. 
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Curtis, J.,Edmonds, J., and o'ar-
ter, J., concurred. ' 
[L. A. 18222. In Bank. July 11, 1942.] " ,I 
MANUEL A. MORENO, Appellant, v. JAMES OAIRNS, 
, ~t aI., Respondents., ",') 
.., ,,: .". '::) 
[1] Municipal Oorporations-Omeera and.Employeeg....i..Removal-
Reina~atemen~Oonditiona Preeedent.-:,""A charter: ,proyia!9n, 
[1] See 12 Oat Jur. 800; 6 O",tJur. Ten-year SuPp. 60; 37 Am. 
Jur.874. 
McK. Dig. Reference:' [1, 2] Municipal Corporatii>ns".§'313i' 
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requiring a person claiming that he has been unlawfully "sus-
pended, laid-off or discharged" to file a demand for reinstate-
ment within a specified time as a condition precedent to an 
action for reinstatement and wages due, although not in terms 
mentioning resignations, is applicable to resignations ,under 
duress. , 
[2] Id.-Officers and Employees-Removal-Reinstatement-Con_ 
ditions Precedent.-A charter provision requiring the filing of 
a demand for reinstatement within a specified time as a con-
dition precedent to an action for reinstatement by a person 
claiming to have been unlawfully discharged is applicable to 
a discharge which is unlawful because made without good and 
sufficient cause and without a hearing. 
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County. Emmet H. Wilson, Judge. Affirmed. 
Proceedings in mandamus to eompel reinstatement to a posi-
tion of an assistant fire chief and to seniority rights and to com-
pel payment of back salary. Judb"ltlent ag-ainst petitioner, en-
tered on the sustaining of a demurrer to a second amended peti-
tion, without leave to amend, affirmed. " 
Joseph K. Coady and Arthur J. Mullen for Appellant. 
Ray L. Chesebro, City Attorney, Frederick von Schrader, 
Assistant City Attorney, and Geo. W. Adams and Marvin 
Chesebro, Deputies City Attorney, for Respondents. 
TRAYNOR, J. - Petitioner appeals from a judgment 
against him entered upon an order sustaining a demurrer, 
without leave to amend, to his second amended petition for 
writ of mandate ,to compel respondents, members of the 
Board of Fire Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, to 
reinstate him to the position of assistant fire chief and to his 
seniority rights, and to pay the balance on back salary that 
he claimed due him. The second amended petition alleges 
that petitioner served in the fire department for forty-two 
years with an unblemished record, that he was adjudged in 
excellent health in the last health examination ordered by 
the board, and that he was summoned before the board and 
was forced under protest to resign. The circumstances at-
tending this resignation are alleged to be as follows: 
"VI 
"That your petitioner has not been unlawfully suspended, 
.,' 
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laid off, or discharged from his position as assistant chief of 
said Fire Department, but on the contrary, your petitioner 
under duress, misrepresentation, fraud and undue influence, 
in that he would be deprived of all pension rights, was forced 
against his will and desire, to resign from his position with 
said department; that on July 1~ 1939, your petitioner, with-
out any notice other than two hours, was summoned before 
the Board of Fire Commissioners; that at such time your 
petitioner was told that if he did not then and there, within 
two hours, resign from his position with the Fire Departrrient, 
he would be summarily discharged, and that ifMw'as SO' dis" 
charged he would suffer a complete loos of all p'eh:sion 'rights ; 
that becaUse of the pressure of duress, misrepresentation, 
fraud, and undue influence of complete loss of 'aU pension 
,rights, your petitioner did resign under protest;; that no just 
or reasonable cause existed that your petitioner 'should have 
bee?" resigned, other than fear of loss of pens~ ri~hts with 
WhICh he was threatened; that no charges of any kind were 
ever preferred against him. 
"VII 
., That at the time your petitioner was forced to retire, he 
was informed that four positions as assistant fire chief were 
to be eliminated, but the rules of seniority then 'in force and 
applicable to petitioner were not applied in the case of your 
petitioner. 
"VIII 
". . . That your petitioner was deprived of his position 
arbitrarily and summarily, in that the procedure required 
by section 135 of the City Charter was not followed, but by 
intimidations, duress and threat of loss of all pension rights, 
your petitioner, against his will and without advice, of coun-
sel, .or allowance of time to secure such advice and counsel, 
was forced under protest to resign." 
About a year after his resignation the petitioner filed a 
petition with the board of fire' commissioners for reinstate-
ment to active service and for rehearing of "enforced retire-
ment. " The board demurred on the sole ground that the 
petition did not state a cause of action because the peti-
tioner failed to file with the board, pursuant to section 112% 
of the charter of the city of Los Angeles, a written demand 
for reinstatement within ninety days following the date on 
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534 MORENO V. CAIRNS [20 C. (2d) 
·which, it was cla~med that he was first illegally, "laid, off, 
suspended or discharged." 
Section 112% of the charter provides: "Whenever it 'is 
claimed by any person that he has been unlawfullysus~ 
pended, laid off, or discharged, and that such layoff, sus-
pension or discharge is ineffective for any reason, any clai:r~. 
for compensation must be made and demand for reinstate~ 
,ment must be presented in writing within ninety days fol-
lowing the date on which it is claimed that such person was 
first illegally, wrongfully or invalidly laid off, suspended, 
or discharged. Such demand for reinstatement must be filed 
with the board of civil service commissioners and such 
claim for compensation for such allegedly wrongful, illegal 
or erroneous discharge must be filed with the city clerk. Fail-
ure to file such demand for reinstatement within the time 
herein specified shall be a bar to any action to compel such 
reinstatement and proof of filing such a demand for rein-
statement must be completed and proved a condition prece-
dent to the maintenance of any action for reinstatement. 
Proof of filing the claim for compensation within the time 
and in the manner herein specified shall be a condition prece-
dent to any recovery of wages or salary claimed to be due 
on account of said layoff, suspension or discharge." 
[1] The petitioner contends that since his separation from 
the department was effected by resignation under duress, 
and not by unlawful suspension, layoff, or discharge, he 
was not required to present a written demand before filing 
his petition for a writ of mandate. This contention over-
looks the fact that a resignation is characteristically the .vol-
untary surrender of a position by the one resigning made 
freely and not under duress. (People v. Marsh, 30 Cal. App. 
424 [159 Pac. 191) ; State ex rel. Young v. Ladeen, 104 Minn. 
252 [116 N. W. 486, 16 L. R. A. (NS) 1058).) The absence 
of any reference in section 112% to resignations is attrib-
utable to the fact that they would ordinarily be voluntary 
and not succeeded by demands for refnstatement, not to an 
intention to exclude from the limitations of that section de-
mands that follow resignations made under duress. Such 
resignations are akin to lay offs, suspensions, or discharges 
by virtue of the element of coercion and bear only a formal 
resemblance ,to voluntary resignations. Whenever a person 
is severed from his employment by coercion the severance is 
effected not by his own will but by the will of a superior. 
, ... 
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A person who is forced to resign is thus iii the'!p'ositiono,f 
one who is discharged, not of one who exerciSes nis own Will 
to surrender his employment voluntarily. The tacit Sense of 
:action 112% is not that the omission of resignations from 
he group of involuntary severances is an' omissionaf 
coerced as well as voluntary resignations, but that coerced 
resignations fall within the group of involuntary severances; 
It is clear from the second amended petition that respon-' 
dents demanded petitioner's separation from the fire depart~ 
ment, that. he was given but two hours to choose betw'een 
formal resignation and summary discharge, and tha:the co-p.ld 
not choose between remaining with the department or leaving 
it. Respondents' and not petitioner's will effected his sep-
aration from the department. There is no allegationtha:t the 
statements regarding pension rights, elimination of, positions; 
or summary discharge were ~ot true and there is therefore 
no essential allegation to support a charge of fraud. (See 
cases cited in 12 Cal. Jur. 800 Eit seq. and 6 Cal. Jur. Supp. 
61.) Fraud is alleged only as a part of the aJlegations, of 
duress and threatened loss of pension rights. The paragraphs 
of the second amended petition quoted above make it clear 
that the petition is based upon allegations of coercion and 
duress. 
Petitioner's emphasis upon the coercion that forced his 
resignation is prompted by the fact that there can be no 
reinstatement after a voluntary resignation. (Kramer v. Board 
of Police Commissioners, 39 Cal. App. 396 [179 Pac. 216).) 
By his own allegations his severance.from his position was a 
resignation in name only, and he seeks reinstatement on the 
ground that it was in effect not a resignation. His failure to 
comply with the conditions of section 112% governing de-
mands for reinstatement compels him to advance his invol-
untary severance of employment as a resignation exempt from 
those conditions. He cannot escape from the dilemma, how-
ever, that the coercion attending his nominal resignation; 
while affording him a ground for reinstatement, also identi-
nes that resignation as an actual involuntary severance froni 
employment tantamount to an unlawful discharge within the 
meaning of section 112V2 of the city charter. A demand for 
reinstatement following severance from employment under' 
such circumstances must therefore meet the conditions of that 
section. . 
[2] Petitioner argues that if the coerced resignation be 
( 
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deemed an unlawful discharge the ninety-day period under sec-
tion 11272 does not commence to run until the board of fire com~ 
missioners has complied with section 135 of the city charter 
providing that an officer or employee cannot be deprived of 
the right to his position without" good and sufficient cause" 
and a hearing before a board of rights on charges preferred 
agairlsthim. A discharge in violation of section 135, how-
ever, would be an unlawful discharge under section 112V2, 
which by its express terms applies to discharges claimed to 
be "ineffective for any reason," and the ninety-day period 
would run from the date of such unlawful discharge. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
Gibson, C. J., Curtis, J., Edmonds, J., and Carter" J., 
concurred. 
[L. A. No. 18354. In Bank. July 11, 1942. ) 
COMMtJNIS'r PARTY OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA et al., Appellants, v. PAUL PEEK, as Sec-
retary of State, etc., et al., Respondents. 
[1] Elections - Political Parties - Capacity to Sue. - A political 
party has a right to maintain an action in this state' in its 
own name. 
[2] Judgments-Declaratory Judgments-Refusal of Relief-Dis-
cretion.-It is not an abuse of discretion for a trial court to 
refuse to grant declaratory relief consisting of an adjudica-
tion of the unconstitutionality of amendments to Election 
Code where it appears from the face of the pleading that Elec. 
Code, § 2900, provides a speedy and adequate remedy. 
[3] Mandamus-Acts Enforceable-Future Acts.-Mandamus will 
not lie to prevent the performance of future acts. 
[4] Elections-Electors-Right of Su:ffrage.-The right of suf-
frage, guaranteed by the Constitution, includes the right to 
vote at all elections which are now or may hereafter be author-
ized by law, including the right to vote at primary elections. 
McK. Dig. References: [lJ Elections, § 34; [2J Judgments, § 14; 
[3J Mandamus, § 6; [4J Elections, § 22; [5, 6J Elections, § 36; 
[7, 10-14J Elections, § 36 (4); [8] Evidence, § 12; [9] Evi-
dence, § 18. 
. ~ 
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[5] ld.-Nominations-Primary Elections-Legislative Power.-
Aside from Const. art. II, § 2V2, the Legislature is without 
power t9 exclude from participation in a primary election any 
citizen who is within the terms of the constitutional provision; 
and this includes the denial to a particular political party of the 
right to participate in a given election in any situation in which 
the party system is an integral part of the election machiner~. 
[6] ld.-Nominations-Primary Elections-Legislative Power-
Scope.-Const. art. II, § 2%, empowering the Legislature to 
determine the tests and conditions for participation in primary 
elections does not confer upon the Legislature unlimited power 
to restrict the constitutional right of suffrage. The legislative 
power conferred is limited to prescribing tests and conditions 
for participation in. primary elections which are reasonable 
and not arbitrary. 
[7a, 7b] ld.-Nom~nations-Primary Electi()ns-WhoMay Partici-
pate-Communist Party.-Elec. Code, § 2540.3, prohibiting the 
recognition of any party using the word' "communist" in its 
designation, is unconstitutional as exceeding the limited power 
conferred by Const. art. II,§ 2%. The legislation cannot be 
sustained upon the theory that it contains an implied legisla~ 
tive finding that such party advocates a forceful overthrow of 
the government, since a statute determining that a particular 
person or group has violated the general law is special in 
nature, and therefore violates Const. art. IV, § 25, subd. 11 . 
[8] Evidence-Judicial Notice-Limitations.-Before a court will 
take judicial notice of a fact, that fact must be a matter of 
common and general knowledge, well established and authori-
tatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain. The test is whether 
sufficient notoriety attaches to the fact to make it proper to 
assume its existence without proof. 
[9] ld. - Judicial Notice - Communist Party. - A court will not 
take judicial notice that the Communist Party advocates the 
overthrow of the government by force. (Characterizing as 
dictum a statement of In re Coon, 44 Cal. App. (2d) 531, 112 
P. (2d) 767.) 
[10] Elections-Nominations-Primary Elections-Who May Par-
ticipate-Affiliation with Communist Party.-The provision of 
Elec. Code, § 2540.4, denying participation in primary elec-
tions to any party affiliated with the Communist Party of the 
United States or the Third Communist International, is spe-
ciallegislation and is beyond the power conferred on the Legis-
lature by Const. art. II, § 2%. 
[11] old. - Nominations - Primary Elections - Who MayPartici~ 
pate-Affiliation with Foreign Agency.-The pr,wision of Elec. 
[8] See 10 Cal. Jur. 693; 20 Am. Jur. 49. 
